What is a nation? Is it a set of borders determined by international institutions? Is it big and diverse, or small and homogenous? How is it decided who deserves to have their own nation- state, and who deserves to be absorbed by others? Traditional security paradigms such as realism have long focused on inter-state security, and thought little about intra- state security of particular cultural and ethnic groups, and these groups are increasingly becoming the primary catalyst for insecurity. S. R. SarDesai defines nationalism as “a common kinship based on language, territory, religion, race, and heritage” (SarDesai 142). This definition hits a snag in many nations, whose senses of nationalism cannot be defined in these terms. This especially seems to be a problem in developing nations in Southeast Asia and Africa, who were left with borders defined by the former colonial powers, and bitter feelings towards one another within these borders as legacies of colonialism. Myanmar is a perfect example of one such nation, in that it lacks a uniting sense of nationalism, which necessarily means that defining national security is complicated.
Myanmar is very ethnically diverse, and the cleavages of these ethnic groups tend to be cumulative and reinforcing of the differences between the groups rather than cross- cutting and unifying. This leads to a cyclical pattern of conflict where the minority is marginalized by the government, which gives them a grievance to incite conflict, which causes the government to allocate its resources solely to protect against these dissident groups, which causes economic insecurity, and then circles back to provide more grievances to the minorities. This connection that exists between Myanmar’s diversity, economics, and conflict is important, because ordinarily the economic issues are talked about separated from the ethnically conflict. However, I propose that by improving the economy, ethnic and civil conflict would gradually cease to be a problem because the economic motivation for remaining in separate, tight- knit dissident groups would not exist.
Myanmar has 135 different ethnic groups, with the majority Burman making of 68% of the population (CIA World Factbook). The most influential ethnic subgroup impacting national security are the Karen, who make up 7% of the population. The Karen are historically resented by the rest of the population, due to the preferential treatment they received under British colonialism and their continued contact with the West (Buadaeng 74). The majority of the Karen practice Christianity as a part of this colonial legacy, which puts them immediately in conflict with the 89% (CIA World Factbook) of the population that practices Buddhism (Buadaeng 77-78). Furthermore, the government since independence has sought complete sovereignty and implemented xenophobic policies against immigration and even tourism, while the Karen have maintained close ties with both Thailand and Western Christian powers such as Britain and the United States (Steinberg 47). The government has long marginalized the Karen, as is shown by the fact that in 1949, just one year after independence, there was already civil conflict (Buadaeng 80). There is believed to be at least 100,000 Karen refugees in Thailand, as well as many more from other ethnic groups (Buadaeng 89). The government fears insecurity from both inside and outside its population, and is reluctant to accept assistance from the outside or to meet any of the demands of dissident groups from the inside. Fighting against one’s own population costs money and resources, which Myanmar does not have in abundance anyways. Myanmar concentrates an extraordinary portion of its gross domestic product (GDP) to the military, with little regard for the social, political and economic reasons for the conflict in the first place.
Myanmar has been under military control since 1962, when General Ne Win threw over the civilian government (Selth 3). The military, known in Myanmar as the “Tatmadow,” has a very mythic and respected place in society, partially b/c it has been the only relatively stable institution throughout Myanmar’s independent history (Steinberg 69). The government has always spent a high percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP) on the military, but it has varied from a high of 49% of GDP in 1999 to a low of 19% in 1988, and is currently at 32% of GDP (Selth 13). As a comparison, the average world expenditure of GDP on the military is around 2% and even the United States, arguably the top military power in the World, tends to stay around 5% (CIA World Factbook). All of Myanmar’s Southeast Asian counterparts implemented economic stimulus plans in 2009 to deal with the global recession, while Myanmar did nothing and continued to pour its resources into the military (Economic Intelligence Unit). This dominating concentration of GDP is completely unnecessary when considering Myanmar’s lack of external threats, with its only significant military security problem being internal insecurity, and threats from refugee rebel groups in Thailand who wish to bring about change in the government. Myanmar is beginning to form a close economic relationship with China, and their superpower status could help protect Myanmar from any external threats that might arise.
The GDP should be redistributed to improve social welfare, infrastructure, and economic disparities, which would be a much better solution for the internal threats than the use of force. Myanmar’s government needs to get their priorities straight, and if they don’t, those priorities will most likely be straightened out for them.
No comments:
Post a Comment