Attacking the Source of Latin American Crime

Latin America is a beautiful place to visit and, in some cases, a great place to live. However much of the region is hindered by a notorious element of crime and violence which in effect has caused citizen insecurity and a lack of faith in the rule of law. Furthermore, this historic problem has induced social capital loss, human rights violations, deterred international business, as well as confidence in state actors, and general public support for iron fist rule in some cases. The most direct causes to these problems have to be the weak or under-resourced institutional factors and bureaucracies in charge of preventing and regulating such crimes and uneven socioeconomic factors like unemployment, general poverty, and lack of opportunity. In other words there is a failure to prevent the problem at the source and then a failure to deal with it once it has passed the point of prevention.
The prevalent socioeconomic problems which are at the root of a lot of the crime in Latin America are basic but effective enough. In places where economic growth is low and unemployment is high people resort to crime out of frustration and necessity. The lack of opportunity for legitimate financial resources in turn causes an outlet for illegitimate financial resources. Terrorist groups like FARC in Colombia are able to gain tremendous support from their young, impoverished population. In fact FARC’s core ideology is anti-elitist and they claim to represent the views of the rural poor pointing to the fact that socioeconomic inequality is indeed fueling a lot of the conflict[1]. Because of the inequalities in Colombia FARC is one of the oldest and most powerful criminal subversive elements in the western hemisphere. However, as economic opportunity grows in Colombia, as it has over the last two decades, the terrorist group’s support has decreased which I believe to be a direct correlation between crime and lack of opportunity.

On the other end of the problem there is an issue of lack of prevention on the part of the state. Government institutions are corroded by corruption and weak bureaucracies. People like Jader Barbalho, a wealthy politician in Brazil, swindled millions of dollars from the State through various fake projects and appropriations taking away not only money which can be used to address the issues of inequality but also the prevention of crime caused by it as well[2]. By doing this Barbalho also takes away from the integrity of the government and further emboldens organized crime to continue and flourish. Infiltration like this is not isolated but omnipresent in Latin America and is perhaps most apparent in some of the Central American region. “Transnational organized crime has penetrated the state at the national and local level, infiltrating political parties, the National Police, as well as the attorney general’s office,” according to the former vice-minister of foreign relations to Guatemala Peralta[3]. Corruption is only part of the equation though. The police force and the various agencies which are charged with keeping the peace and protecting citizens has failed in many places. In Sao Paulo, the market for privately owned helicopters is the largest out of any place in the entire world. This is mainly because people want to stay out of streets and above the crime. Others have resorted to body-guards, motorcades, and bullet-proof vehicles. There is a legitimate fear of crimes, especially kidnapping, and a complete lack of faith in the ability of the police forces to prevent these crimes or returned loved ones if they are kidnapped. In light of the prevalence of insecurity many have tried to address the problems of ineffective and undersupplied police agencies but few have made any real strides. Some, like the former president of El Salvador’s Security Council Oscar Bonilla, believe that in order to repair inadequate forces the entire system must be addressed as a whole. “A solution requires an integrated effort that engages civilian institutions, the penal system, and the police^[4].”

The crime and violence which has been a characteristic of Latin America is no different from crime and violence that happens in the United States. The only difference is crime has been allowed to spiral completely out of control creating a deep sense of insecurity among the citizens and as a result people are unsure of how to cope or solve this conflict. Crime is derived from lack of opportunity, frustration, and the socioeconomic hardships. You can see examples of this in many American inner cities where gangs are a way of life for many people looking for a means of survival and a place in society that has left them none. This crime and violence is only made worse by incompetent police forces and corruption. The only way to diminish crime and violence in Latin America and in any part of the world is to eliminate the need for it by providing more economic opportunity, uprooting corruption, and devoting substantial resources to every sector of the judicial and anti-crime sectors and agencies. This, of course, is easier said than done but I believe countries in Latin America like Brazil and Colombia which have seen economic growth and will continue to see this growth over the years to come can remain optimistic as this is the key to eliminating that need for crime and violence.

Germany’s Bleak and Gray Outlook

With one of the world’s most rapidly shrinking populations, Germany faces many challenges to military security and economic stability. The country is de-militarizing as it realizes its coming shortage of human capital, and the need to shift focus to the economic sphere. However, in less than fifty years, over one third of the population will already be over the age of sixty. This will put huge stresses on social welfare programs and the overall spending budget, while Germany will have increasingly high dependency ratios. With an aging population and negative population growth, Germany’s total trade has decreased over the last three years. Although this was mainly due to the global recession, falling rates of domestic consumption are also a huge cause for concern.

In order to combat the negative externalities from Germany’s population trends, the government needs to focus on ways of increasing productivity levels. This can be done through automation, outsourcing, and research and development in order to find innovative ways to combat an increasingly insufficient labor force. This would help keep the country more competitive in coming years, but there is also now a greater reliance on exportation then ever before. Germany is highly reliant on other economies demand levels for success, therefore losing relative power within the European Union and global economy. The country’s trade surpluses are skyrocketing, and this has drawn much concern from other European Union member-states. There is a substantial reliance upon high trade surpluses for economic growth, which makes the economy more susceptible to global economic issues.

Failure to reduce net exports and combat labor shortages will be linked to the reduction of trade volumes in the future, because with all else equal less human capital will result in lower output volumes. With such a heavy reliance on exportation, lower production levels could provoke a domestic economic crisis. The potential labor pool is decreasing nearly twice as fast as the population, while increasing proportions of the population are elderly and reliant upon government. The country has embarked on numerous policy objectives to combat the multitude of challenges ahead, including the reallocation of military defense money to economic stimulus programs. The country has dedicated many resources, and high levels of investment in capital-intensive technology that will work to replace reliance on human participation. Nevertheless, the unbalance in the German economy is clear, as spending and income levels have stayed stagnant over the past ten years; exports share of GDP has risen over twenty percent. No other large, advanced economy is so reliant on other nations consumption levels for success and this will lead to questions about their future position as a global financial leader. French leaders claim that exports account for nearly fifty percent of the country’s gross domestic product, and they are looking for extensive policy reform of European Union trading patterns.

While the country’s de-militarization signals a shift in governmental focus to the economic sector, policy concentration needs to continue to move away from unemployment, disability, and retirement benefits. In the coming era of tight labor markets, unemployment should be eradicated, and poverty levels will improve. However, with the country rapidly depopulating, the tax base is going to take a drastic hit. Therefore, funds to combat these population trend issues will become relatively smaller and smaller. Sustained levels of productivity are a continued focus for the German government, but there is some question as to how successfully the aging workforce will successfully adopt new forms of technology and organization. Older workers tend to be less adaptable, technically apt, and many times are missing the skills needed in high-tech development occupations.

In order to successfully combat extensive labor pool contraction, Germany will be forced to heavily rely on the prevalence of positive participation from immigrants. There will be increased security risks and losses in social cohesion, but migrants could help facilitate increased production for the German economy, and even boost domestic demand levels for certain foreign products. However, policy focus in the economic sector is somewhat limited due to Euro zone policy constraints. Acceptance of the euro results in Germany not having a currency to devalue, which is an important tool in making exports relatively cheaper in the global economy. Future German officials, in response to drastic population decline, will have to move away from a social model, and will be forced to rely on increasing immigration, computerization, and outsourcing for continued economic success.

Communism, Capitalism, Alcoholism?

While this was happening there was another transformation happening, a less obvious one whose affect is only beginning to be seen today. Since 1990, Russia has been in the process of an epic population shift that brings Nicholas Eberstadt to assert in his Slipping Growth that, “judging by vital statistics alone, it looks like a country trapped in a prolonged and devastating war.” In 1990, Russia’s population was 148 million people. Today, it has already decreased by over 8 million and according to the United Nations Population Division it is on pace to decrease by 40 million in the next 40 years.

While it is not uncommon that developed countries begin decreasing in population because of lowered fertility rates, the swiftness that Russia is losing people is eerily similar to the atrocities committed in Stalinist Russia or Mao Zedong’s China. However, instead of dying from gulag prison camps or a “great leap forward” Russians are dying from a failure of the regime to establish a competent health care system.

Alcohol consumption in Russia is currently 100 times the global standard set by the World Health Organization. According to Russia’s public chamber, the death toll directly and indirectly linked to alcohol hovered near 500,000 people just last year. Along with alcoholism, Russia suffers from the 11^th highest HIV infected population in the world and a shocking level of increased cardiovascular related deaths. Eberstadt claims in his The Enigma of Russian Mortality, “Russia’s mortality levels from CVD alone stand some 30 percent higher than deaths in Western Europe from all causes combined.” All over the world cardiovascular related deaths are lowering however, Russia has somehow managed to reverse the trend. A failure of this kind falls squarely on policymakers who refuse to dedicate the necessary resources to a dying population.

Russia is a very privileged country with the largest natural gas reserves in the world and is the 2^nd highest oil exporting country, behind Saudi Arabia. However, Russia is insistent on preparing for unnecessary and quite frankly for non-existent threats. Russia’s defense spending is rapidly approaching the $60 Billion mark which is the fifth largest in the world. The world we live in is no longer dictated by the size of a country’s standing army. State on State conflict seems to be disappearing as fast as the Russian population. However, Russia’s defense spending continue to balloon.

Russia’s healthcare bonanza is much more of a threat to its national security than any other state or non-state actor. Russia’s nuclear stockpile is made up of 12,000 nuclear warheads, which is good for the largest in the world. In fact, if you were to decrease this number by 11,700 it would still have the 2^nd largest in the world. This gives Russia the most powerful nuclear deterrent in the world. That in and of itself reduces the likelihood of an all out state on state conflict to almost zero. Russia must begin reducing its defense spending and concentrating on setting up a working healthcare system. More and more Russian’s are unable to work because of treatable, non-communicable diseases. This includes the military, in which 60% of draft eligible men receive deferment, generally because of health reasons. For now, Russia is able to mask its economic problems because of its enormous energy sector. However, each year that it allows to go by without addressing the healthcare of its citizens, Russia loses more and more people that can aid in a non-petro economic resurgence.

Defeat From Within: Israel's Disproportionate Arab and Jewish Population

The first President of Israel Chaim Weizmann wrote once that Israel was “a land without people, for a people without a land.”¹ The irony is there were people— a lot of people— forced to leave their homes, or become part of the Jewish state. Once upon a time Israel “overran” Palestine; now Israel is being “outran” by Arab people. Based on the current growth rate of Arabs and Palestinians, it will not be long before the Arab population takes over from within. From 2000 to 2025, the Arab population increased by 6% whereas Jewish population decreased by 7%.² Currently even Arabs within Israel don’t call themselves Israeli, and the OECD member countries chose not to put their embassy in the capital because of the illegal annexation of East Jerusalem.³ There are two main instigators of conflict: Israel’s long standing border dispute with Palestine and the intentional and unintentional segregation of Arabs, and what exacerbates these issues is the disproportionate growth rates of Arabs and Jews.

Population has a lot to do with why Israel wants the land but not the Arab people. It’s not just ethnic hatred, but Jews want a Jewish state and if the West Bank and Gaza are annexed, Israeli Jews will become the minority in 10 years, according to Monica Toft. To illustrate my point three factors need to be taken into account: First, the Disproportionate population growth of Arabs and Jews and their distribution; Secondly, the disproportionate number of young within the Arab and Jewish population; and thirdly, the disproportionate employment and economic level among Arabs and Jews.

On the national level the annual growth rate for Aras and Jews are 2.6% and 1.7% respectively.⁵ If we go a level deeper and look at population distribution, it’s evident that large Arab populations are located in the Northern and Jerusalem District, comprising 44% and 19% of the Arab population in the Northern and Jerusalem District.⁶ A level deeper reveals the population in the Northern District is 53% Arab, which makes the Jewish population the minority. Furthermore, there is still a Jewish majority in Haifa District with 24% of Arabs, Southern District with 16%, and the Tel Aviv and Central D. have the lowest percentages of Arab population in the State (1-8%).⁷ Additionally, there are 129 localities that are entirely made up of Arabs, and 35 localities comprising less than 2,000 Arabs.⁸ Concentrations of Jewish and Arab population, and localities that are almost completely made-up of Jews or Arabs is evidence that Israeli Jewish and Arab populations segregate.

Why is this information useful for predicting conflict? Because it becomes evident that Israel is a stratified country, refusing to integrate. Israel’s national identity is closely related to its population identity, and if trends continue, Jews will be the minority. Stratification indicates disproportionate distribution of benefits. Compared to Jewish men, double the number of Arab men do not participate in labor market. Even more alarming, the OECD reports only 15% of Arab women participate in the work force, whereas 53% of Jewish women participate. These numbers highlight the reality of Arabs in Israel—they are the poorest ethnicity (excluding the small population of ultra-orthodox Jews).

Currently all of Israel’s districts have populations where 22- 35% of the population is 15 years of age or younger. This is a huge number of people entering the job market, and as can be expected Arabs have a much higher number of relative youth. The median age for the Arab population is 20; for Jews it is 31. ⁹ Unfortunately, this large cohort of young people may not be able to find jobs. The OECD found the number of teens not working and studying in Israel was 60% higher than member states. This is a significant number of young and jobless people.

To relate youth and conflict, Henrik Urdal says, it is the large numbers of unemployed youth in the context of a government that does not provide support that instigate internal conflict. Another population expert, Monica Toft, says in a multinational state that has some correlation between distribution of benefits (like employment opportunity) and group identity, disproportionate population growth can be a major source of conflict. In this case it is the differential growth of Arab and Jewish populations that creates conflict. Therefore, high overall unemployment and youth unemployment, in particularly the Arab population, can create motives for conflict in light of rapid Arab population growth.

According to the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD, the stability of Israel is a high concern to the developed nations of the world, and as such Israel was just accepted into OECD, which is a club of the 31 most powerful economies in the world. And I, a population and national security student at Rhodes College, suspect that with the reputation of countries like the United States, Germany, France, and Japan Israel will be more driven to solve its internal and external conflicts with Palestinians and Arabs.

Mao’s Cold Greeting: Aristotle’s Cold Reply

Healthcare’s role in instigating Chinese Insecurity

This past summer two observations struck me while visiting several Chinese hospitals. First, walking through urban health centers is analogous to a game of hopscotch from the overflow of patients sitting on the floor, and second, rural health centers are eerily empty. Despite improvements in healthcare since the Chinese Communist Revolution, with life expectancy rising from 40.8 to 73.0 between 1950 and 2010, the system has not kept pace with the demographic changes.

Communist China ignored Aristotle’s concept of an individual’s right to health, but the philosopher may have a final say. Demographic challenges like China’s rapidly aging population, predominant rural population, growing economic disparity, and disease rates put a strain on an already crippled system. If healthcare reform to accommodate these trends does not occur, China’s national security will be threatened.

Capability

The capability of a healthcare system is its ability to manage the influx of citizens into the system. Since the 1980’s, the one-child policy has prevented at least 250 million births creating the 4:2:1 problem. As the population ages and healthcare needs increase, children will, by law, be required “to support and assist their parents.” As this scenario develops, so will social and economic insecurity, as society finds itself in a game of tug-of-war between governmental law and job commitments. If China chooses work over care, social insurrection may grow over elderly neglect. Alternatively, time devoted to elderly care would cause great economic loss especially given a declining work force.

By 2050, China’s elderly will make up 35.6% of the population, compared to12.3% currently. China has made no move to accommodate the rapid demand in healthcare needs that this aging population will require; with the number of hospital beds and doctors per 10,000 people stagnating at 23 and 15, respectively, between 1989 and 2003. This system will not accommodate patient load, initially creating structural insecurity that may progress into regime insecurity, as sick people are refused care. Although it is hard to imagine the elderly storming the Great Hall of the People with their pension cards, anger could manifest itself through their already neglected children, a group that has displayed volatility in the past.

Alternatively, increasing GDP expenditure on healthcare from 4.5% to a reformative level will be necessary if China chooses to dramatically increases healthcare supply; this will be at the expense of other spending priorities of the GNP “pie” and could threaten China’s more urgent desires, such as a move to a technologically based military.

Breadth

China must create an insurance program that will provide the poor with an opportunity to receive comprehensive healthcare. Providing care to the 900 million rural inhabitants must also be a forerunner in policy reform if China is to care for its civilians.

Currently, in rural areas, there are 1,116 beds/million people, compared to 5,777 beds/million in urban areas. This, in addition to the fact that the majority of doctors serve in urban areas, suggests a vast disparity between urban and rural coverage.

If the healthcare needs of the rural population are not addressed, this population will be predisposed to disease, malnutrition, and other variables that influence physical and financial loss, instigating risk to the structural security of China. The rural population serves as China’s providers, supplying food and raw materials for production. If the life expectancy of the working, rural population drops, or there is migration out of these areas into cities in order to seek medical attention, China might run the risk of not having a large enough rural workforce to support the needs of its urban citizens. The communist government should take note of its birthplace, a dissatisfied rural population, and realize that if structural security of individuals is not met, regime security may decrease.

Medical costs are the primary blockade to healthcare for the urban poor and rural populations. The healthcare reform of the 1980’s decreased health coverage per capita from 100% to 10%. Despite various insurance programs initiated in the last seven years, which have increased insurance coverage from 190 million to 1.13 billion, many Chinese are still left paying as much as 50-60% of expenses, an access limiting amount.

Despite the government’s efforts to provide insurance, its actions may catalyze further discontent. By reducing the barrier to access, more people have access, yet many will also demand more coverage in order to resolve the more apparent disparity. Such threats to regime security have been seen in the U.S. through the demand for healthcare reform.

Preventative Action

Demographics and epidemiology affect the entire population, not just the extremes, and pose just as strong, if not a stronger threat to China’s security. The increased incidence of cancers and chronic illnesses are trends that impartially attack the population.

Cancer threatens China’s security from multiple angles. Environmental degradation that results in the formation of “cancer villages” can catalyze discontent and anger in rural populations. Other occupational hazards in factories can pose a threat to the working class. A study by Pronk et al., in 2004, concluded that people who work in Chinese factories pose a higher risk of cancer than those who don’t. Demands for a safe workplace and community could pose a threat to Chinese economy if workers take it upon themselves to strike, which has already been seen. With China’s reliance upon its lax environmental standards to keep costs low and attract foreign investment, consequences of such strikes could be severe. Additionally, increased cancer prevalence increases health system burden, since treatment requires extended stays and it is a relatively expensive disease to treat.

Cardiac disease, which is China’s leading killer, primarily inflicts the elderly. Increasing incidences of this disease threaten the capacity of the healthcare system, but more importantly, threaten the economic strength of China. Due to decreased productivity and early death, the total economic loss in 2000 due to cardiac disease was $30 billion U.S. dollars; if this trend continues, cumulative loss between 2005-2015 would be approximately $556 billion dollars.

Healthcare reform shows no sign of attacking China’s growing demographic malignancy. If health trends continue at the current pace, the state will fall victim to not only a declining population, but to a volatile population that expects to be cared for. Addressing healthcare reform through a dynamic approach in the areas of capacity, breadth, and prevention will provide the best means for reducing demographic pressures. If this approach is not followed, China’s national security will be at risk. If the state cannot maintain its structural security expectations, it risks loosing regime security through civil discontent and economic losses.

South Africa: Population as a Boon or Burden?

Carolyn Lamere
The idea that population can have an effect, positive or negative, on the economy of a country is not a new one, nor is the notion that a country's economy is intimately linked to its national security. There are few countries, however, which can claim that their population is both a boon and a burden; South Africa is one of these few.
It is no secret that South Africa struggles with a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS infection that has been ravaging its population since the mid 1990s. The most demographically terrifying aspect of the disease, besides the fact that there is no cure, is that it affects primarily the men and women of working and childbearing ages in a given population. In other words, the disease primarily affects the citizens who should be the bulk of South Africa's workforce and the parents of the next generation of South Africans. HIV/AIDS, then, is ravaging South Africa's economy by decimating its present and future workforce.
Despite this marked disadvantage, South Africa still has the strongest economy in the region, ranking number 26 in the world for its GDP in PPP. Elizabeth Leahy of Population Action International writes of the potential for a “demographic dividend” in countries with traditional age structure. Since countries with a declining birth rate have a large proportion of their population in the workforce, they are able to be highly productive. South Africa is a good example of a country with a transitional age structure as its total fertility rate, or the average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime, has declined steadily and rapidly since 1960. This means that there are fewer dependent children in South Africa now than there have been in the past, allowing for maximum productivity in the workforce.
The impact of South Africa's booming economy, especially when compared to some of its neighbors, can be seen in the development of alliances. Among these is IBSA, a trilateral alliance between India, Brazil, and South Africa. That South Africa was included in an alliance with these two regional giants speaks volumes to the impact South Africa has managed to make in the region; Brazil and India each have substantially larger populations and subsequently larger potential workforces than South Africa. This partnership also hints at South Africa's international aspirations that are beginning to be manifested in an alliance with such far-flung partners. While each member of IBSA is still struggling with poverty (in 2004, IBSA members held 43 percent of the world's poor), South Africa is still the only one of the three facing a desperate against HIV/AIDS. How can the country with the largest number of people infected with HIV/AIDS in the world truly be an equal partner with states that do not have the same massive challenge to overcome?
As Leahy states, “demography is not destiny;” there are factors besides population that contribute to the success or failure of a state. For example, Zimbabwe has seen a decline in total fertility comparable to South Africa's, but no corresponding economic boom due to economic and political mismanagement by the government. Similarly, South Africa's former President Thabo Mbeki's refusal to acknowledge the link between the HIV virus and the AIDS disease and the effectiveness of antiretrovirals in treating HIV/AIDS set South Africa back in its fight against the aggressive disease. But South Africa's relative economic success proves that, for the most part, its economic and governance policies have been beneficial to the growth of the state.
Despite the overwhelming challenge posed by HIV/AIDS, there is still hope for South Africa. It has successfully transitioned to democracy from the dark apartheid era, and remains one of the few viable democracies in Africa today. It successfully hosted the World Cup this past summer, showcasing its capabilities to the world. South Africa certainly has a long way to go in the battle against HIV/AIDS, but has demonstrated its commitment to the fight. If South Africa dedicates resources to countering the spread of HIV/AIDS and continues to strengthen its international alliances, it will continue to reap the benefit of its demographic dividend.

Indonesia and the Papuan problem

Indonesia has had a long and difficult history with many of the ethnic groups amongst what is a diverse population covering a vast area of land, with the remote locations of these ethnic groups only adding to the challenges presented. The two most publicized have been the rebel group in Aceh province in northern Sumatra and the East Timor crisis in the late 1990’s. However, the new and potentially more devastating crisis is developing in the province of Papuan problems, and the Indonesian government may find itself facing familiar problems, as well as venturing into uncharted territory.

Indonesia has been in control of Papua, the largest and richest province in minerals and biodiversity and has faced almost constant opposition from the native, ethnic Papuan community, although, unlike other situations (notably East Timor), has international recognition of its legitimacy in the area. The native ethnic Papuans, made up of numerous smaller groups, are a mixture of traditional tribal religions and Christianity, mainly Catholicism and believe that Papua is owed self-determination and independence from the rest of Indonesia. In recent years, many immigrants from other parts of Indonesia have been encouraged to move to Papua to help develop the economy and provide labor for some of the mining and timbering processes that are helping to fuel the Indonesian boom. With many of these immigrants being ethnically Indonesian and Muslim, tensions have arisen between the two groups, with protests and strikes around the mining companies and in the major cities being common. There are unconfirmed reports of many protestors, Papuan locals, being killed.

There was hope that the grievances of the locals would have been eased somewhat during the process of decentralization that the new democratic Indonesian government undertook in 1999, with Special Autonomous Status being granted in 2002, and the Papuan’s Peoples Council, a council of elders to represent traditional tribal customs, being established in 2005. However, this has had limited success. A report by Brussels based International Crisis Groups has reported that the many of the local citizens feel that the autonomy is largely ineffective, and that the local law is being trumped by national law too often for it to have any real impact and leaves questions of how much devolution has really been granted. The report warns of the increasingly likelihood of radicalization of the opposition movement unless the central government in Jakarta begins to take this issue more seriously. The US has also begun to take an interest in this area of conflict, with Deputy Secretary of State Joseph Yun recently saying “if the 2001 Special Autonomy Law can be fully implemented, we believe that a lot of frustration currently felt by Papuans would decrease” although stopping from going as far as saying that it would completely resolve the situation.

A more holistic approach concerning the structural security of the region should also be included in the government’s plans to reduce tensions in the area. With Papua consistently finishing bottom of the table according Badan Pusat Statistik (Indonesia’s Bureau of Statistics) for Human Development Index, as well as a literacy rate 23% lower than that of Java and the highest HIV/AIDS rate in Indonesia, it is clear that the problem of the relative disparity of wealth and resources is also a contributing factor. For many Papuans, the central government and the ethnically Indonesian immigrants it encourages appear to be a threat to their culture and way of life, exploiting the natural resources of their island, without contributing much in return.